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Abstract: Asset securitization as the essential financial tool has increased the liquidity of 
underlying assets and promoted rapid economic development. In 2008, the outbreak of Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis that brought by the collapse of securitization triggered the U.S. securitization 
market to realize the risks involved in structured financial products, and thus facilitated the 
development of risk controlling tools. Through the analysis of securitization process, drivers, and 
credit rating agencies, the study concentrates on the formation of risks and modeling evaluation 
with evidence in both China and the U.S. markets. Statistical analysis was conducted on Chinese 
securitized products combining with risk management models built in the U.S. market. The 
results not only show risk evaluation tools that could improve the market maturity but also 
reveals the lack of information disclosure in China with the limited access to historical data. The 
paper attempts to address policy recommendations on mitigating potential risks and promoting 
financial developments in the China securitization market. 
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I. Introduction 
Securitization has been perceived as one of the most innovative financial tools in recent 
decades and played an essential role in promoting international financial markets. Referring to 
the process of converting illiquid credit assets or instruments (a portfolio of bonds or credit 
default swaps) into marketable securities, securitization creates liquidity in the marketplace for 
the securitized assets (Cerrato, Choudhry, Crosby, etc. 2012, p.2). Since the 1970s, home 
mortgages pooled by U.S. government agencies. In the 1980s, other asset classes with 
continuous cash flow start to pool and repackage into marketable securities. A company as the 
originator firstly combines loans or income-producing assets into the reference portfolio and then 
sell the pool to an entity, usually a financial institution. In the second step, the financial 
institution, known as Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), would sell the pooled assets to capital 
market investors by issuing tradable, interest-bearing securities. The process of employing 
securitization allows financial institutions transfer the credit risks from their balance sheets to 
other entities, such as banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies. From the view of the 
originating banks, securitized assets are less costly to hold and also result in an inflow of cash. In 
theory, the transaction transfers credit risk to a third party. Though issuers take advantage of 
accounting rules, the risks of owing the assets could not be neglected in reality (Jobst, 2008, P.9).  
In fact, a detailed analysis of the legal structure of asset securitization reveals that it is 
primarily a process of reallocating investment risks. In addition to increasing capital liquidity, 
investment risks are made between different stakeholders and enlarge the difficulty of control 
with extended financing chain. The recent "subprime mortgage crisis" in the United States shows 
the risks involving in securitization and vulnerability of the financial system: excessive risk 
transfers, implicit guarantees, conflicts of interest between repeat mortgages and rating agencies 
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(Zhou and Chen, 2014, p.3). The paper aims to contribute to the prevention of potential risks in 
China's progress of asset securitization through the warning from the crisis and the comparison 
between the U.S. and China securitization markets.  
A. The trend in global securitization 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Total securitization in Europe and US between 2001- 2016 Source： SIFMA 
 Banks were typically using deposits to finance and hold loans until maturity before the 
development of the securitization market. Therefore, loans funded by deposits and debts 
(Cerrato, Choudhry, Crosby, etc. 2012, p.2). Arose from the secondary market in 1970, the first 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) passing principal and interest payments on mortgages to 
investors was guaranteed by Ginnie Mae. Fannie Mae, a federal-government chartered 
corporation, also fostered the development of home mortgages (Cowan, 2003, p.2). Cited by 
Mordel (2010), from 1996 to 2006, the asset-backed securitization (ABS) market along with 
MBS grew from $456 billion to $2.8 trillion, an astonishing 500% growth (p.51). The 
involvement of U.S. subprime mortgages was the driver of global financial crisis, which caused 
the sudden drop in total securitization in the worldwide market. Figure 1 shows the overall 
securitization in the U.S. and European market between 2001 and 2016. The market reached its 
peak in 2008 at the start of financial crisis.  
MITIGATE RISKS IN SECURITIZATION MARKETS 
 7 
B. China securitization market  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Total securitization in China between 2005 to 2016  
Source： Wind news, and Central Clearing Company 
Compared to the global trend in securitization, China started the attempt to securitize 
non-performing assets much late than other markets. In 2005, China began to pilot work on the 
asset securitization under the particular asset management plan of securities companies, which 
marked the official launch of asset securitization. Though the government issued incentive 
policies and improved relevant taxation, the development process was relatively slow from 2005 
to 2013. Especially in 2008, due to the fear of being hit by the financial crisis, China suspended 
its approval of asset securitization projects (Zhou, 2014, P.69). The securitization market has 
seen explosive growth since 2014, the issuance size of credit asset-backed securities reached an 
increase of 285% over the previous year. From the product structured, credit ABS has always 
accounted for a significant proportion. The scale of securitization products expanded 
significantly in recent years. Figure 12 shows the total securitization issued in China market 
between 2005 and 2016.  
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Though the securitization market in China has developed quickly that ranks as the first in 
the Asian market, compared to the U.S. market, it is still young on risk management in the fields 
of risk evaluation tools and regulatory support. This paper combines evidence in both China and 
the U.S. to attempt to address the implications for financial stability arising from securitization 
after the global financial crisis. In the following section, the paper discusses the existing 
literature. Section 3 illustrates the empirical evidence on the role of securitization. Section 4 
specifies data description and research methodology. Section 5 presents a discussion of results. 
The paper ends up in section 6 and 7 with a summary of the policy implications and conclusions.  
II. Literature Review 
Existing research about risks specified in China securitization market concentrates more on 
regulatory improvements due to the limited credible domestic cases for statistical analysis. The 
U.S. securitization transactions with sufficient data and theoretical support have analyzed in 
previous studies. This paper carries out evidence-based studies using data in the U.S. and China 
markets, and also literature research on both aspects.  
Cerrato, Choudhry, and Crosby (2012) stated on the primary motivation for banks to 
securitize. They gathered dataset covering annual accounts for 690 UK banks during the period 
2000 to 2010. Using six different measures of liquidity, including interbank ratio, Liquid 
Assets/Customer Deposits and Short term funding, Liquid assets/Total deposits and Borrowing, 
Net Loans/Deposits & Short-term funding, Net loans/Total Assets, Net Loans/ Total deposits and 
Borrowing. The results apparently show that the principal driver of securitization is liquidity, 
whether banks need to fund their balance sheets. Zhou and Chen (2014) illustrated that the driver 
behind securitization was enhancing capital liquidity, which inevitably increases the potential 
investment risk. Firstly, since the risk of asset securitization mainly comes from the underlying 
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assets composed of the debts assets with future earnings, the risk transfer would not reduce and 
mitigate risks even though being recomposed. Secondly, the intricate designs and repackaging of 
asset securitization extended risk effects. Investors-holding securities mean that risk spreads 
from the minority to the majority. Such proliferation may be negligible when the total risk is 
small, but as promoters and SPVs continue to increase for self-interest debt of the underlying 
assets, the scale of asset securitization and market coverage enlarged significantly. Mandel, 
Morgan, Wei (2012) investigated the role of banks as credit enhancements in the securitization 
process. They used cross-sectional regression models to examine the relationship between the 
performance of securitized assets and the extent of credit enhancements. The results put forward 
the buffer hypothesis that improvements are a buffer against observable risks and also serve as a 
signal of unobservable quality.  
Salah, Fedhila, and Hassouna (2012) sampled 174 US commercial banks between 2001 and 
2008 to analyze the impact of securitization on risk behavior. Combining commercial banks’ 
accounting data and macro-economics variables, they reported a greater recourse to 
securitization is associated with an increase of the credit risk in their balance sheets. To further 
analyze the effect of securitization on credit risk in American commercial banks, they modeled 
with the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. The results revealed that different classes of 
securitized assets lead to heterogeneous effects on bank credit risk. Krahnen and Wilde (2006) 
focused on a strong relationship between that the announcement of securitization and systematic 
risks of all tranches. They used a simulation of European banks’ returns and bank’s equity beta 
measures a risky activity during the launch of a securitization transaction. Also, Interbank 
linkages would increase when risks are transferred to other banks and therefore augment 
systemic risks. Wu, Yang, and Hong (2008) researched the impacts of asset securitization of U.S. 
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commercial banks’ risk exposure during the period 2003-2007. To access banks’ exposure to 
various risk factors in the securitization market, they adopted a time-varying risk beta model, in 
which a bank’s exposure to a common risk factor and a function of multi attributes. Their results 
of 229 banks in the model revealed that banks’ securitization activities increased their exposure 
to credit, liquidity, and secondary market risks.  
Santiago, David, and Francisco (2011) analyzed the quality of MBS and ABS securitization 
in Spain from 2000 to 2010. They sampled 565 securities of MBS and 420 securities of ABS to 
identify the primary determinants of the changes in the quality of MBS and ABS. Their 
estimation model concluded that the sequence of credit quality mainly determined by loan 
growth on loan performance. Subsequently, they generalized their findings to other countries 
where securities allow issuers to transfer credit risks usually involve a more extensive retention 
of the underlying risk within banks’ balance sheets. Segoviano, Jones, Lindner, and Blankenheim 
(2013) explored the financial stability implications resulting from securitization markets. They 
addressed the factors that either are currently facing obstacles or have contributed to the financial 
crisis. Besides regulation initiatives mentioned in most of the other papers, they discussed the 
role of operation infrastructures; insufficient resources and contradictions between services and 
trustees suggested that additional reforms put forward to lower their overwhelming places in 
financial crisis. Guided by features of securitization, they further proposed policy 
recommendations to mitigate impediments affecting financial stability and thus to build a healthy 
securitization market. Na, in his paper (2011, P326) worked on American development process 
about the asset securitization. Narrowing down the topic of the U.S. mortgage securities study, 
he focused on the impact of mortgage securitization on financial stability in the U.S. economy. 
Fluidity, the risk transfer and diffusion mechanisms of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) 
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addressed as factors contributing to the outbreak of the financial crisis, which brought by the 
asset securitization. Securitization caused the risk of continuous expansion, circulation, and 
return, along with the increase of credit scale. Sub-debt then turned into bad debt, the financial 
chain is destroyed, which leads to the financial and economic instability. Concentrating on the 
situation in China, they proposed recommendations for the authorities to be aware of the rapid 
increase of asset bubbles and non-performing loans, for the governments to compensate defects 
in market liberalization, for improving the credit system, laws and regulations in China. 
III. The securitization motivation, risk, and financial stability 
A. Product structure design, risk transfer, and credit enhancement 
Going depth into the analysis of product structure of asset securitization, it is the process of 
asset restructuring and financial intermediation utilizing financial instruments. The basic 
structure involves same segments throughout the world having securitization products: First, the 
asset pool, or asset packaging, means that sponsors can produce a stable cash flow of similar debt 
assets and regroup, forming a "pool of assets." Second, the transfer of assets means that the 
promoters transfer the assets to an SPV through trust or transfer, which constitutes the basis for 
SPV's issuance of securities. Third, credit enhancement refers to the process that SPV increases 
the credit level of the accepted assets to meet the required standard of issuing securities. 
Maintaining the level of investment credit becomes the basis of the asset. Fourth, the issuance of 
securities by SPV is to obtain the appropriate funds. Fifth, pay the consideration, SPV use funds 
raised by the publication of securities to pay the sponsors as the transfer of the attention of the 
assets and then use the proceeds of the transferee to pay securities investors securities principal 
and interest (Zhou and Chen, 2014, p.4). The security instruments are doing well on improving 
the operational efficiency of assets; transferring the future of the debt assets into securities assets 
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successfully changes the illiquid assets. The overall structure seems to be a perfect design that 
risks transferred from sponsors to the SPV and eventually dispersed to investors to buy 
securities. Actually, just because of the structural design and motivation, potential risks spread 
from the minority to the majority. Even worse, without the necessary precautions and controls, 
risks would affect the macroeconomics like the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis.  
 In the system design level, the risk transfer is actually the re-allocation of risk and is also 
the primary motivation of securitization. Because the risk of asset securitization mainly comes 
from the securitization of the underlying assets, the transfer of risk is not possible to reduce the 
objectively existing risk. With the new allocation and the transfer of underlying assets, the risk of 
the original claims borne by the sponsors also transfers to the SPV and the securities holders. 
Asset securitization has changed the status of risk, making the risk switching from stock to 
liquidation. Regarding the characteristic of risk transfer for securitization, if asset-backed 
products lost supervision, the risks would spread and harm the financial markets. 
The other driver of securitization, credit enhancement, refers to the issuer using various 
methods to improve the credit rating of securities, which ensures investors pay interest and 
principal on time and therefore enhances the wide acceptability of the securities. The design 
seems to reduce overall risks of underlying assets, especially credit risk, and disperse to those 
who can and are willing to tolerate. However, asset securitization may make the originator's risk 
content more complicated, and credit enhancement may keep the risk of asset securitization still 
at the originator (Pan, 2011, P3). For example, banks construct the principal and interest payment 
order for credit enhancement of credit assets and only selling the priority bonds. Reserving of 
subordinated bonds moves assets subordinated bond, but banks can do little on mitigating risks 
on subordinated bonds. Therefore, after the securitization of assets, although the amount of the 
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assets initiated by the agency decreases, the risk level of the assets may increase instead. Risk 
transferring and credit enhancement, as the significant benefits, motivate agencies to securitize 
assets, but they are also the causes of financial disaster on the other hand.  
B. Securitization products and associated risks  
There are four types of structured mortgage products (SMPs) in the typical U.S. market and 
similar types of products in China market. Every kind of products has its related risk: The 
underlying assets of ABS include credit card loans, car loans, student loans, equipment lease 
payments, trade receivables, tax liens, etc. As the financial crisis erupted, the size of ABS shrank 
dramatically. In 2013, the volume of U.S. asset-backed securities dropped to $1.2 trillion from 
$1.9 trillion in 2007. MBS includes Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) and 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security (CMBS). The balance of MBS had a nearly 10% 
decrease as of the second quarter of 2013. The potential risks of ABS and MBS mainly 
concentrate in the underlying assets themselves. Factors such as rising interest rates, falling 
housing prices and dropping economics all have a negative impact on cash flows of underlying 
assets. For example, in the sub-prime crisis, the cost of MBS decreased significantly due to the 
rise of the default rate of subprime mortgages and the deterioration of underlying assets. 
Collateralized debt obligation (CDO) includes corporate bonds, emerging market bonds, and 
bank loans, and later gradually comprises mortgage loans, MBS and ABS and other securities. 
By 2008, the size of the global CDO has expanded to $1.4 trillion, while affected by the financial 
crisis it dropped to $803.5 billion by 2013. Some types of CDO have complicated structures with 
repeat securitization, which lengthens the intermediary chain of funds and exacerbates the 
asymmetric information so that investors are hard to know included underlying assets and the 
percentage of toxic assets. Repeat securitization is aiming to package low-quality assets, so the 
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default risk mostly is hidden in CDO. Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) is a securitized 
commercial paper. The underlying assets of the ABCP include trade receivables, car rental loans, 
credit card receivables and securities with 3-5 years’ maturity, while the majority of commercial 
paper issued within 30 days. The earnings of ABCP come from mismatched spreads of assets 
and liabilities. Once the confidence of investor declines, refusing to finance the newly issued 
ABCP, the market would quickly fall into the liquidity crisis (Zou Xiaomei, Zhang Ming, Gao 
Pei, 2014, P14).  
 
Figure 3: Overview of Subprime Risks 
Significant risks arising from SMPs are credit, market, operational, tranche and systemic 
risks. All categories of risks describe as subprime risks. Petersen, Mukuddem, Waal, etc. (2011) 
provided the figure above shows the diagrammatic overview of the mentioned subprime risks 
(P14). The most primary dangers among all above are credit and market risk. Credit risk may 
cause the mortgage loss of originator and the possibility that SPVs are unable to make payments. 
Credit risk will be analyzed in detail in later sections with financial models and banks’ financial 
statements during the financial crisis. Subcategories of market risk consist of interest rate risk, 
liquidity risk, and price risk: interest rate risk results from the fluctuations of SMP interest rate 
returns, and Liquidity risk arises from SMPs could not be bought or sold as anticipated, which 
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also include funding and credit crunch risk. Operational risk occurs when the insufficient or 
inadequate procedures, processes, systems or improper actions have taken during the process of 
securitization. In structured finance, a tranche refers to security can be split into smaller pieces 
and sold to investors. Tranching risk causes the complex associated with the slicing of SMPs into 
tranches in securitization deals. Another tranching risk, maturity mismatch risk, arises from the 
discrepancy between the economic lifetimes of SMPs and the investment horizons of investment 
banking. In banking, systemic risk is the risk for the whole banking system, meaning that a 
single failure can cause a bankrupt in the banking system or market. 
C. Rating changes and financial stability 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have contributed a lot to the growth of the securitization 
market. At the early age of mortgage securitization, CRAs always gave out AAA for investment 
grade ratings regarding the continuously rising house prices and relatively low-interest rates at 
that time. Triggered by the marketability of ABS deals, CRAs as underwriters gradually 
acknowledged the complexity and opacity of ABS instruments. Before the subprime mortgage 
crisis (SMC), the quality of mortgages was more important than quantity of originated 
mortgages. The desired high-yielding ABS deals make CRAs face a demand for grade inflation. 
CRAs have two primary incentives to give out over-optimistic ratings on structured mortgage 
products: First, issuers want higher scores on their products, while issuers are clients of CRAs 
and would jump to other agencies if they cannot receive satisfied ratings. Second, investors like 
banks and insurance companies desire to use high-rated securities to reduce capital on hand. 
However, over-optimistic ratings of structured mortgage products helped inflate the housing 
bubble, so that embedded credit risk of mortgages outsources through the securitization process. 
Moreover, individuals and institutions put excessive confidence and reliance on credit ratings 
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provided by CRAs before SMC. In 2006 and 2007, refinancing faced more difficulties, so that 
mortgage delinquencies increased and RMBs lost value suddenly. Petersen, Mukuddem, Waal, 
etc. (2011) investigated 19 American banks from 2001 to 2005 on the information asymmetry 
issues in agencies using bank credit risk evaluation models. Their findings show that issues in 
agencies themselves and information asymmetry problem significantly caused the deviation of 
agency credit ratings (P34). Because of the failure of independent analysis on the underlying 
assets, during the SMC, the house prices declined, the value of securities decreased, and default 
rates increased dramatically. As a result of SMC, the RMBS market frozen, which spread to the 
whole financial system and result in the collapse.  
The risks along with asset securitization continue to expand and transfer; as a result of the 
SMC, the securitized financial chain destroyed, and financial institutions with connection 
affected each other, leading to the financial instability. From the point of rating agencies, to 
obtain more profits, they liberalized the condition of loans. The action prompted some investors 
who could not have permission to enter the real estate market, resulting in the collapse of the real 
estate bubble. Once the financial chain among a series of financial institutions broke, investors 
lost confidence in the market and led to fluctuations in the financial system. From the perspective 
of currency liquidity, asset securitization caused inflation, which affected the overall economic 
stability. In the meanwhile, the paradox between the need for innovative financial products and 
damaged credit rating led to the credit market supply exceeds demand. Eventually, the collapse 
of the final innovative financial product price undermined financial stability. Liu (2017) also 
analyzed the effect of risk transfer and diffusion mechanism to financial stability: the credit risk 
was initially locked to banks, but then spread to pension funds, mutual funds, commercial banks, 
insurance companies and foreign investors through asset securitization process in the United 
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States. The credit risk spread to a greater extent due to the risk transferred. Because of the default 
of investment bonds, its investment value depreciated and its liquidity declined. This reduced 
investor confidence and led to a depressing bond market and financial market turmoil (P20). 
IV. Data Description and Methodology 
A. Altman Z-score: A tool to predict credit risk for an individual bank  
Edward I. Altman published The Altman Z-score formula in 1968, which is a value to predict 
the likelihood that a firm will go bankrupt in two years. The score is usually used to predict 
default risk, to measure financial distress and the financial health of a company. Investors could 
use Altman Z-scores to determine the underlying company’s financial strength and whether to 
invest in the company or not. In 2007, while credit ratings of securities generally higher than 
they should be, the Altman Z-score indicated the companies’ risks. The average Z-score for 
companies in 2007 was 1.81, meaning that over 50% of companies was overvalued and 
experienced high financial pressure by credit agencies. Garg (2017) calculated the Altman Z-
score for Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock in 2007, a year before financial bankruptcy, to 
support the argument of credit risk in the securitization market. This paper developed an analysis 
of commercial banks in China using Altman Z-score, which hasn’t utilized in previous studies. 
As an example, the financial data of China Construction Bank uses for the calculation of Altman 
Z-score, which is the first bank to attempt securitization in China. Data obtained from 
companies’ annual report. The Altman Z-score is calculated using five financial ratios: 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, solvency, and activity. The equation is as follows: 
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5. 
X1 = working capital / total assets. 
X2 = retained earnings / total assets. 
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X3 = earnings before interest and taxes / total assets.  
X4 = market value of equity / book value of total liabilities.  
X5 = sales / total assets. 
Table 1: Financial Statement of 2007, in millions 
 Lehman Brothers Northern Rock 
Total Assets $691,063 $109,321 
Total Liabilities $668,577 $106,621.7 
Working Capital $22,486 $2,700 
EBIT $6,013 $5,979 
Retained Earnings $19,698 $1,251.9 
Market Value of Equity $22,490 $1,23.90 
Net Revenue $19,257 $6907.5 
 
The following table shows the financial ratios and corresponding Altman Z-score for 
Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock:  
Table 2: Results of Altman Z-Model for Two Banks 
 Lehman Brothers  Northern Rock 
(Working Capital/Total Assets)*1.2 0.0325 0.02469 
(Retained Earnings/Total Assets)*1.4 0.0285 0.0115 
(EBIT/Total Assets)*3.3 0.0087 0.0546 
(Equity/Total Liabilities)*0.6 0.0336 0.0011 
(Revenue/Total Assets)*1.0 0.0278 0.0631 
Z-score 0.1464 0.289668 
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The zones of discrimination for Altman Z-score: Z > 2.99 – “Safe” Zone; 1.81 < Z < 2.99 
– “Gray” Zone; Z < 1.81 – “Distress” Zone. The table 2 above clearly showing that Lehman 
Brothers (Z-score: 0.1464) and Northern Rock (Z-score: 0.2897) were on the verge of 
bankruptcy in the year 2007. 
Analysis of China Construction Bank Using Altman Z-Model (Data retrieved from 
bank’s annual report 2007, in billions in Renminbi): 
Total Assets = ¥65,981.77 
Total Liabilities = ¥61,758.96 
Working Capital = ¥4,233 
EBIT = ¥3,257 
Retained Earnings = ¥17,845 
Market Value of Equity = ¥4,222.81 
Net Revenue = ¥691.42
Table 2: Results of Altman Z-Model for China Construction Bank 
Financial Ratios Result 
(Working Capital/Total Assets)*1.2 0.0760 
(Retained Earnings/Total Assets)*1.4 0.0028 
(EBIT/Total Assets)*3.3 0.1617 
(Equity/Total Liabilities)*0.6 0.1458 
(Revenue/Total Assets)*1.0 0.0105 
Z-score 0.3968 
 
The Altman Z-score result of China Construction Bank is 0.3968. Though the value is 
higher than that of Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock, it is still far below the safety line of 
1.81. It is “lucky” for commercial banks and corporations in China that the government forced 
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stopped the approval securitization securities. Before the global financial crisis, commercial 
banks in China were facing huge financial pressure as well and default risk became even worse 
after being affected by the crisis. Altman X1 measures liquid assets compared to the size of the 
firm, providing the short-term financial position of the business. Generally, the more working 
capital to total assets is, the better the liquidity situation. However, if the value is too high, it may 
result from high inventory and improper use of excess cash. X2 measures profitability in relation 
to the company’s earning ability and how much the company relies on its debt. Retained earnings 
would be used for a company to operate a further business and to pay off debt. So, if the firm is 
luck of retained earnings, it will borrow from debt. X3 measures operating efficiency that how a 
company could generate profits before interest and taxes from assets. The ratio shows operating 
earnings in relation to long-term viability. X4 measures how is the market value of the company 
and also shows the security’s price fluctuation. However, the ratio is controversial because when 
the stock price of the firm is high, the ratio rises up, which could be the reason that coefficient is 
the least among all components. X5 measures asset turnover, indicating efficiency and business 
quality of the firm. The ratio shows higher when the ability to generate more profits from assets. 
The original test was collected from 66 manufacturers and did discriminant analysis based on 
their common financial ratios. Then, Edward used the method for other industries and eventually 
set for the zone of safety, zone and dangerous. In 1999, the model was tested to be 80-90% 
accuracy in the use of predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. In 2009, Graham Secker, an 
analyst in Morgan Stanley, collected data from European companies and analyzed with Altman 
Z-score. Results show that companies with lower Z-score value are actually underperforming 
than the market average performance (“Is it possible to predict corporate bankruptcy using a 
formula?” 2011).  
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B. Z-score: A risk-taking measurement for an overall banking system    
The famous bank risk measurement was primarily proposed by Roy (1952) and 
subsequently used by Goyeau and Tarazi (1992), Laeven and Levine (2006), indicating for the 
ability of bank risk-taking. The calculation assessed by the accounting of banks, showing the 
distance from insolvability that a higher Z-score means a lower probability of default risk. To 
capture the default risks in a country’s banking system, the formula would weight regarding the 
total assets of an individual bank. Mathematically, it denotes as follows: 
 
The numerator shows banks’ buffers of returns and capitalization, and contrasts to the 
denominator explains the volatility of returns. The ROAA defines as the average return on assets 
(ROA), Equity/Asset defines as the capital ratio, and standard deviation of ROAA shows the 
volatility of the average return on assets. Based on the accessibility of data on Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED), especially the length of Chinese banks data published, the graphs below 
present bank z-score comparing China and the United States from 2000 to 2015.  
 
Figure 4: Bank Z-Score in China 2000-2015        Figure 5: Bank Z-Score in the U.S. 2000-2015 
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The results compare the volatility of equity returns and the volatility of earnings as 
measures of bank risk. The approach constructs the time-varying z-score consisting with the 
banks’ risk profile and risk-taking ability throughout the time. The Z-score is useful to identify 
the minimum level of a capital amount in banks and standardize credit risk level in the banking 
system. 
Besides the contributions of ROA and capital ratio to banks’ Z-score in China, a 
regression model further developed among Bank Lending Deposit, 5-Bank Asset Concentration, 
Outstanding Domestic Public Debt Securities to GDP and Credit to Government and State-
Owned Enterprises to GDP. The multiple regression results showed in table 3. The multiple 
regression can express as followed regarding to the results: 
Z-score = -4.82 + 6.27 X1 + 13.11 X2 – 0.42 X3 +1.31 X4 -1.06 X5 
 X1: Return on Asset (An indicator to show commercial banks’ net income compared to 
total assets). The observation combined with Return on Equity (ROE) could show the 
profitability of countries’ commercial banks. 
 X2: Bank Lending Deposit Spread (Difference between the lending rate charged by 
commercial banks on loans and deposit interest rate on three-month deposits). Mortagage and 
securitization are both methods of financing for firms that relationship indicates in the equation. 
Moreover, mortgage uses as collateral for the ABS trust that sold to investors.  
 X3: 5-Bank Asset Concentration (Five largest commercial banks in a country as a share 
of total assets in banks. Total assets include total earnings, cash and due, fixed assets, current and 
deferred tax assets, goodwill, other intangible and other assets). The role of assets is critical to 
determine whether the banks in a country are on the edge of default.  
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 X4: Outstanding Domestic Public Debt Securities to GDP (Total amount of domestic 
public debt securities/outstanding compared to the share of GDP. The total amount of debt 
securities includes long-term bonds and short-term notes, short-term notes, treasury bills, 
commercial paper). The observation shows the relationship among debt securities, insolvent 
bank risk and being available to analyze contributions for securitization status.  
 X5: Credit to Government and State-Owned Enterprises to GDP (Compared credit by 
domestic money banks to the government and state-owned enterprises and GDP). The 
observation of enterprises value owned by the government is valuable due to the power of 
Chinese government in the banking system and percent of government-owned enterprises and 
banks as well.  
 The equation selects five indicators to analyze the relationship contributing to banks’ Z-
score. The purpose of analyzing the observations is to forecast Z-score and risks involved in a 
country’s banking system, which is closely related to securitization volatility.  
C. Risk pricing mechanism: A model to measure prepayment assumption 
Compared to the developed market, the current transactions of asset securitization market 
in China relatively lacks liquidity, information disclosure system, and credit rating mechanism. 
The current pricing models in China securitization market bases on the future cash flow, 
anticipated yields or spread difference of interests. More quantified pricing models built 
concentrated on liquidity and capital costing, but the models cannot adequately reflect real risks 
level. With the variety of underlying assets and transaction structure for securitization continue 
to increase, product risk assessment is more difficult. Incomplete and not matching product 
pricing mechanism also leads to potential risks in China securitization market.  
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Big differences are affecting the prepayment behavior between China and the United 
States: First, the most important factor motivates the U.S. borrowers to prepay is to benefit from 
interest rate differences. However, in China, since borrowers are not allowed to refinance, if a 
borrower intends to refinance when the interest rate drops down, he can only pay ahead relying 
on his income. Therefore, income level is the most determinant factor affecting borrowers in 
China. Since income per capita in China is lower than that in the U.S., and Chinese borrowers 
are less sensitive to market interest rate, the borrowers in China have higher willingness to pay 
ahead than US borrowers. Moreover, because Chinese residents have different understanding in 
mortgage owning to culture differences, they are more likely to use excess deposits to pay off 
home mortgage loans in advance, which rarely happens in the U.S. 
Mortgage loans issued by commercial banks generally give borrowers the right to pay off 
in advance. The right is valuable for loan lenders, but the prepayment option will lead to future 
cash flow instability of RMBS, which forms prepayment risk. Prepayment becomes a risk on 
fixed-income securities when the principal is returned ahead, so that investors on RMBS would 
not receive expected interest paid on principle. Fixed-income securities like MBS products and 
callable bonds would be affected by the prepayment risk. The prepayment rate measures the 
percentage of the current outstanding loan balance, which is generally expressed by Single 
Monthly Mortality (SMM) and Constant Prepayment Rate (CPR). SMM expresses monthly 
mortgage prepayment rate of the existing mortgage pool. CPR refers to the annualized 
percentage of the mortgage pool that is expected to prepay in a year. The conversion between 
SMM and CPR expresses as following:  
SMM = Prepayment Amount / (Loan Balance at the beginning of the month – Expected 
Amount to pay in the month) or SMM = 1- (1 – CPR) ^ (1/12) 
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Because prepayment rate volatility mainly affects RMBS market and the limited 
information disclosure for other securitization products, data collects from RMBS products in 
recent ten years.  In December 2005, “CCB 2005-1”, the first RMBS security in China was 
initiated by China Construction Bank and officially issued to institutional investors in the 
national interbank bond market. Since “CCB 2005-1” is the longest-lived home mortgage-backed 
bond in China, its data is mostly complete. The process of calculating SMM from historical data 
of “CCB 2005-1” is shown in Appendix Table 4.  “PSB 2014-1” is the first personal housing 
loan supporting securities issued by Postal Savings Bank of China in 2014. “CCB 2005-1,” 
“CCB 2007-1,” and “PSB 2014-1” are highlighted as research object: 
 
 
Figure 6: RMBS Prepayment SMM Summary 
Figure 7: SMM Movements of RMBS Products 
Resource: HTFICC Macro-Scale Research 
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Figure 8: China RMBS CPR from 2006 to 2016 
Figure 9: Chinese RMBS CPR based on Months since Closing       Resources: Fitch Ratings 
The figure 6 shows statistical description of the three typical RMBS securities in ten 
years. The figure 7 presents SMM value of the three products on a semi-annual basis. The Figure 
8 and 9 obtained data from Fitch Ratings, presenting CPR of most active RMBS on an annual 
basis and based on months since closing. The most three longest RMBS securities (“CCB 2005-
1,” “CCB 2007-1,” and “PSB 2014-1”) presents both in SMM and CPR value.  
V. Discussion of Results  
A. Altman Z-score model 
Altman Z-score formula is one of the good indicators to predict the probability of bankruptcy 
in the credit market. Altman himself believed a crisis was going to happen from corporate 
defaults before SMC, while a large-scale meltdown started from MBS market and then a 
widespread failures spread to enterprises in 2009. From the analysis of financial statements in 
2007, a year before the financial crisis, Lehman Brother has Z-score of 0.1464 and Northern 
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Rock has Z- score of 0.2897, which are far below the “grey line” of 1.8. In September 2008, 
Lehman’s share tumbled over 90% and Dow Jones dropped over 500 points, which was the most 
massive drop in a single day. In February 2008, Northern Rock already lost over 90% of its 
value, and it was taken into the state-owned bank then. The exposures to large-scale distress risk 
gave the market alert of using Altman Z-score formula as one of controlling measurements for 
potential vital risks.  
China Construction Bank, the second largest bank in mainland China, is the first commercial 
banks launched credit asset securitization in 2005 as a pioneer in the pilot program. From Altman 
Z-score of 0.39 above, in 2007, China Construction Bank experienced financial distress as well. 
Moreover, financial crisis started in the United States and mainly caused by securitization 
terrified Chinese government. To relieve economic pressures and restore investor confidence, the 
United States and the United Kingdom adopted buyout policy or recognized the value of 
securitized products. However, the Chinese government was aware of the source of risk involved 
in securitization, and the credit market was shrinking, so that securitization projects were wholly 
suspended by government since 2009. Though the action that entirely denied the value of 
securitization was considered as a failure by some economists, it survived the recovery of 
Chinese economics based on a degree of oversensitivity (Hong, 2010). After the credit market 
was getting restored and flaws in securitization getting appeared, Chinese market restarted 
securitization market on a more safety basis with reform of financial regulation. Promoting risk-
control models, including the Altman Z-model, would contribute to stabilize financial market 
and improve the legal system.  
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B. Bank Z-score 
Banks’ Z-score is valuable to measure the ability of risk-taking in a country’s banking 
system and the distance to insolvent. The accounting-based value relates banks’ capital level to 
their variability in returns, assuming a bank would become insolvent if its capital level drops to 
zero. The graphs above illustrate the volatility of Z-score during 2000 and 2015 comparing 
China and the U.S. banking system. Since a higher Z-score implies a more stable condition, it is 
clearly shown on the graphs the U.S. banks performed better in recent fifteen years. The variance 
from 2000 to 2015 in the U.S. is 4.259, while the variance in China is 18.813 that is much more 
turmoil. In the U.S., Z-score is generally above 25 after 2005, except the year of global financial 
crisis in 2008. In China, the banks’ condition just became steady after 2009. The bank default 
risk was highest in 2004 with 0.53 Z-score and lowest in 2014 with 1.43 Z-score.  
The multiple regression analysis outputs present in Appendix examined the effectiveness 
of Z-score with other bank-related variables on an annual basis: Bank Lending Deposit, 5-Bank 
Asset Concentration, Outstanding Domestic Public Debt Securities to GDP and Credit to 
Government and State-Owned Enterprises to GDP. The R Square of 0.95 and Adjust R Square of 
0.926 indicate that about 95% of the variation of variables has explained by the model.  The 
small significance F also verifies the validity of the regression. Since all P-value of coefficients 
is below 0.05, null hypotheses are accepted. The lower the P-value is, the higher valid of the 
ratio is. Overall, the bank Z-score and its comparison with other parameters are the good 
indicators for financial distresses and measurement for banks’ decision making. Contributing to 
the progress of securitization market, banking system needs good approaches in measuring 
individual risk and systemic risk. Especially in the Chinese market, due to the lack of exposure 
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of banking data, methods for rating agencies and regulatory authorities are needed to mitigate 
potential risks.   
C. Prepayment model 
 
According to the historical data analysis of “CCB 2005-1,” “CCB 2007-1,” and “PSB 
2014-1”, the mean SMM rate of China's earliest RMBS securities is 1.36%, which is equivalent 
to 15.14% of CPR. The three-single RMBS historical prepayment rate data shows a high 
correlation, and the first personal housing loan supporting securities “PSB 2014-1” has lower 
SMM rate. However, the volatility of prepayment rate is relatively strong. The highest value of 
SMM is 3.11% (equivalent to CPR 31.58%), while the lowest value is 0.26% (corresponding to a 
CPR of 3.08%). According to statistics from the US Securities Industry and Financial Market 
Association (SIFMA), similar RMBS products’ CPR in the US is much lower than that in China, 
which is between 2.5% and 8%.  
The research of prepayment risk model in the U.S. has experienced the following stages: 
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) firstly assumed that most borrowers would pay off their 
mortgage loans within 12 years. Then, an empirical model established FHA links between 
prepayment rate and durations left to pay off loans, while neglects other factors. Public Security 
Association (PSA) proposed a model, implying the prepayment speed of securities. The PSA 
Model divides a pool of assets into two different periods. The initial period assumes the 
prepayment rate experiences a steadily rising period in the first 30 months, considered as 
“the ramp.” It assumes standard prepayment starts at zero and increase by 0.2% each 
month, and a 6% CPR used. In realistic, yields usually bases on a higher or lower 
prepayment assumption: 50% PSA assumes a 0.1% monthly increase in CPR until the 3% 
CPR reaches. 200% PSA assumes a 0.4% CPR monthly rise until the 12% CPR reaches. The 
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250% PSA indicates that CPR of the base models is multiplying by 2.5 for every month 
in first 30 months until 15% CPR reaches. After 30 months, the prepayment rate gets 
slowing down, considered as “off the ramp,” and then the speed remains constant until 
the remaining life. The graph below compares brand new loans’ prepayment speeds 
(CPR) at different percentages (50%, 100%, and 250% PSA) with upcoming months. 
(“Measuring Prepayment Speeds: CPR, PSA, SMM,” 2016).  
 
Figure 10: PSA model for Brand-new Loans 
Usually, there is a high negative correlation between interest rate changes and the U.S. 
prepayment rate. In China, there are four characteristics and trends of prepayment rate of 
RMBBS in China: Firstly, the prepayment rate of China's RMBBS products has a strong 
seasonal fluctuation, and the first quarter in each year is clearly in peak season. The primary 
reason is that most companies will issue year-end bonuses during the period from New Year's 
Day to the Spring Festival. Borrowers tend to use the surplus to pay off the rest of the loans. 
Then, the interest adjustment day for most loans is on January 1st. in each year. So, if the 
benchmark lending rate increase, borrowers may choose to pay early to reduce the debt burden. 
Secondly, along with the increasing age of issuance, prepayment rate will enter stable periods 
after MBS issued for 6 to 7 years. According to the assumption of the PSA model, the 
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prepayment rate is getting stable after 30 months (the 5th year). Based on limited historical data 
of RMBS issued in China, the overall prepayment rate doesn't show a stable condition along with 
the increasing age as the PSA described. Observing the CPR of the most extended “CCB 2005-
1” and “CCB 2007-1” in figure 9, the two products did show a gradually declining trend after 45 
months. For reducing the random factor influence, movement shows on a semi-annual basis that 
could better reflect moving trends. Thirdly, the active level of real estate market is one of the 
most critical factors affecting prepayment rate, which negatively correlates with long-term 
financing interest rates. Besides the reason that U.S. borrowers would prepay for the loans 
because of increasing interest rates, most of the Chinese residential housing mortgage loans are 
floating interest rates. Borrowers have neither motivation to refinance nor possibility to 
refinance. Therefore, most of the prepayments occur in China are caused by the sale of the real 
estate asset. Further research can develop on the correlation between prepayment rates and the 
quantities of commercial housing dealings. Moreover, other factors also affect the activity level 
of real estate market, such as macro-economics condition, national policies, residents' income 
expectations, etc. Since transactions of real estate market become active while the interest rate is 
getting lower, the long-term interest rate has a negative relationship with prepayment rates. 
Fourthly, prepayment rate has a significant effect on shortening the duration of RMBS products. 
According to the analysis of the composition of the three single RMBS prepayment rates, 85% 
homeowners chose to prepay entire mortgage amounts, while only 15% or less decided to prepay 
part of the sun. The characteristics above indicate a more volatile prepayment rate in China 
securitization market. Due to the differences in mortgage policies, prepayment assumptions in 
China need to adjustments based on foreign models and related models to other factors, such as 
aging analysis, the activity level in real estate market, market interest rate, etc. 
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VI. Policy implications on risk control 
On the one hand, asset securitization, as one of the most creative financial instruments, 
reduces liquidity risk and interest rate risk resulted from to short-term deposits and long-term 
loans. Also, it dramatically improves the profitability of commercial banks. On the other hand, 
asset securitization increases systemic risk in financial market. The original goal for the financial 
tool is hedging and diversifying risks, if it is not regulated effectively, it would eventually 
become a risk for investors and may transform to a massive systemic risk like the SMC. Because 
of varieties among different countries’ securitization policies and process, risk management in 
Chinese securitization market needs to study from developed countries and specialize in the 
Chinese market. Combining above fundamental and modeling analysis, recommendations to 
control risks has made as followings:  
a). Improve market pricing maturity: The pricing of credit asset securitization products 
depends on the supporting of a large amount of credit rate and related information. Only when a 
complete and effective mortgage loan information database have established, credit risk and 
prepayment risk could better analyze that suitable pricing methods for securitization products can 
be used to reflect their true value. Improving pricing methods in sponsoring and investment 
institutions can guide investors to obtain a reasonable valuation from the perspective of reducing 
credit risk premium and liquidity risk compensation. Besides investors’ independent due 
diligence, investors need to identify securities based on qualitative modeling analysis, bank 
assessed the credit risk, refinancing risk, and early-compensation risk of asset pools and 
subordinated securities, combined with scenario analysis and stress testing, and loss distribution 
measurement. Asset securitization pricing is gradually shifting towards marketization and 
standardization. 
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b). Improve information disclosure system: The lack of information disclosure 
mechanisms and transparency of the credit rating system are considered to be the major causes of 
the financial crisis. During the research about risks on securitization products, it is clear that 
related data is much open in the U.S.  market. The transparency and independence in the credit 
rating agencies are crucial for the Chinese market, which is beneficial for investors to quickly 
and clearly understand the degree of risk.  
c). Improve market supervision system: Financial institutions may transfer all or part of 
risk assets from the balance sheet through asset securitization, which thereby would shift credit 
risk from the credit market to the capital market. The separation of credit and capital market 
supervision would result in a vulnerability in surveillance. Though credit rating agencies 
distinguishes between the U.S. and China market, governments need to coordinate microscope 
risks supervision on financial institutions with macro-scope control on laws and regulations. 
Legal insufficiency on bankruptcy and segregation of underlying assets need to be solved. 
Moreover, the government could not be too restrictive to control the market that may limit the 
activeness of the secondary market. 
d). Improve accounting regulatory system: IAS 39–Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement describe that if the cash flow generated by the acquisition of financial assets 
has expired by contracts, enterprises should terminate the confirmation of financial assets. It is 
controversial whether the process of asset securitization shall terminate the recognition as an 
asset. It is hard to fully confirm termination conditions due to the complexity of the securitization 
activities, including the transfer credit agencies of asset pools, excessive cash flow, credit 
enhancements, etc. (Pan, 2010, P6). Therefore, having a completed accounting and law 
regulatory system are needed to standardize securitization market. 
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VII. Conclusion 
The object of this research is to promote financial institutions in China to mitigate 
potential risks and facility the maturity in the securitization market. Through analyses on 
essential causes of the financial crisis started in the U.S. and comparison on progress in Chinese 
securitization market, this paper put effort on improving risk evaluation models and address 
regulatory recommendations. 
The third part of the research concentrate on how and why securitization products has 
been designed in the market, which contributes to the risks analysis based on nature of the 
products. Different underlying assets for securitization then facilitate their associated risks. The 
maturity of risk evaluation and supervision mostly affect the stability in the financial market. 
Data from both American and Chinese banks are used for the Altman model, focusing on 
individual banks’ credit risk. Z-score model further analyzes the risk-taking ability of banking 
system in the U.S. and China. The third prepayment model specifies in Chinese RMBS market 
that guides on securitization pricing methodology.  
Securitization has two sides. Though its risks can cause market turmoil and financial 
system instability, securitization plays a vital role in promoting financial development. Previous 
trials on securitization and long-term data from developed markets would provide support for 
Chinese financial institutions to mitigate risks in promoting the development of securitization.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Multiple Regression 
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Table 4: SMM Calculation for CCB 2005-1  
 
 
